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Substantial Compliance:
Substantially Erroneous Doctrine
by Jack Leyhane
I.

INTRODUCTION

frequently list detailed steps that a policyholder
must follow in order to recover on the claim. If
a court interprets the contract language literally, consumers can be denied coverage by
failing to fulfill a condition precedent in the
insurance contract that may seem, to some, like
a technicality. When courts do this, they are
requiring "strict compliance" on the part of the
policyholder with all of the terms and conditions of the policy in order for the policyholder
to recover on an insurance claim. Many courts
do not require strict compliance. Instead, a
growing number require "substantial compliance" with the terms and conditions of the
policy in order for a policyholder to recover on
an insurance claim.
The definition of "substantial compliance"
varies greatly with the jurisdiction. Some
courts, as will be discussed below, require
policyholders to make a good-faith attempt to
comply with the provisions of the policy.
Others require almost nothing of policyholders,
and allow policyholders to refuse to provide
the insurance company with the information
needed to complete its investigation.

The insurance business is a multi-billion
dollar industry. The agreements between
policyholders' and insurers affect every aspect
of a policyholder's life, including health,
housing, cars, and employment. Most consumers never think about their insurance policies
until a loss occurs, such as a theft or the destruction of their home or business by fire.
Only then do policyholders typically consult
their policies to determine what steps they
must take to obtain indemnification under the
policies.
Few consumers realize that an insurance
policy, in essence, is simply a contract between
a policyholder and an insurance company. Like
any contract, an insurance contract is construed
strictly against its drafter, the insurer. "[T]he
purpose of an insurance contract is indemnity
and therefore the policy should be liberally
construed with uncertainty resolved in favor of
the insured. However, the general rules which
favor the insured must yield to
the paramount rule of reasonable
construction which guides all
contract interpretations." 2 It is
Jack Leyhane is a member of Condon &
how a court strikes this balance
Cook,,c
Chicago litigationboutique which
- between liberal construction
regularly represents insurersand their insureds.
with a view toward fulfilling the
purpose of indemnification and
Leyhan e is a 1980 graduateof Loyola
the paramount rule of reasonable
Univer sity Chicago School of Law. He is a
construction - that determines
the outcome in many insurance
frequen:t authorand lecturer on insuranceand
cases.
In this article, we consider the
litigati n topics and co-authors a monthly
situation where a policyholder
column in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin
presents a claim on his or her
entitled '"InsuranceIssues."
own policy. Insurance policies
1997

Loyola University Chicago School of Law * 353

This article examines how courts in Illinois
and across the nation have interpreted insurance contracts in the context of litigation
between a policyholder and insurance company. Each of these approaches has pronounced effects on the likelihood that fraud
will occur, directly affecting the cost of insurance premiums. For those states that have
adopted a "substantial compliance" approach,
this article recommends an approach that
courts in those states should take in applying
this doctrine. This approach will enable courts
to balance the interests of individual policyholders attempting to recover on particular
claims with the interests of premium-paying
consumers as a whole.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Process of Recovering on
an InsurancePolicy

Generally, insurance policies require policyholders who want to recover on insurance
claims to do four things. First, policyholders
must notify the insurer of a loss within a
relatively short period of time. Second, they
may be asked to submit a "proof of loss" to the
insurer. This is a form used in the insurance
business which requires the insured to provide
specific factual information about the loss,
such as the cause and origin of the loss and the
amount claimed under. the policy. The form is
signed by the insured and notarized. Third, if
the insurance company requests it, policyholders must submit to an examination under oath
("EUO"). An EUO has some similarities to a
deposition, in that, as the name suggests, the
policyholder gives testimony under oath,
usually before a court reporter. Also like a
deposition, the policyholder has a right to have
counsel present, but counsel's role is more
circumscribed than in a deposition. Finally,
policyholders must produce all related financial documents.
These provisions are found in virtually every
insurance policy providing property coverage,
354 • Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

from an individual renter's policy, to complex
commercial forms covering skyscrapers or
multi-site industrial risks. In many jurisdictions, these provisions have been considered
conditions precedent to recovering under the
policy.
Consumers should realize, however, that this
"formal" claim handling is not required every
time a policy claim is presented. As a practical
matter, with the exception of the notification
requirement, insurers do not seek compliance
with these requirements unless fraud by the
policyholder is suspected. (Detailed investigation of every single claim would be prohibitively expensive.) The cooperation provisions
of the insurance policy exist for the purpose of
allowing an insurer to identify and resist
suspected fraudulent claims. As the United
States Supreme Court explained in Claflin v.
Commonwealth Insurance. Co.:
The object of the provisions in the
policies of insurance, requiring the
assured to submit himself to an
examination under oath, to be reduced to writing, was to enable the
company to possess itself of all
knowledge, and all information as to
other sources and means of knowledge, in regard to the facts, material
to their rights, to enable them to
decide upon their obligations, and to
protect them against false claims.3
Based on information gleaned from its
investigation, the insurance company must
either pay the claim or deny payment. If the
insurance company denies the claim, a policyholder can sue the insurance company for a
breach of the policy. This is known as a "firstparty claim." In deciding first-party claims,
courts must frequently examine whether the
policyholder cooperated with the insurance
company in conducting its claim investigation.
However, to the detriment of consumers
generally, the requisite level of policyholder
cooperation is eroding in many jurisdictions.
Volume 9, number 4
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Why Insurance Companies Need
Policyholders to Cooperate (and Why
Consumers Want Policyholders to Do
So).
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consumers' premiums, courts should require
policyholders to cooperate with insurance
companies' investigations.
Not only do consumers as a whole need
policyholders to comply with insurance companies' investigations, insurance companies
themselves also need policyholder cooperation
so that they can comply with state regulatory
requirements. For example, Illinois, like most
states, imposes a statutory obligation on
insurers not to engage in the "unfair claims
practice" of refusing "to pay claims without
conducting a reasonable investigation based on
all available information." 5 Under current
Illinois common law, an Illinois insurer is not
entitled to deny claims without conducting a
reasonable investigation; however, an insurer
has no right to compel a policyholder's meaningful cooperation in a post-loss investigation.
This leaves insurance companies with the
responsibility to investigate claims and little
power to conduct such investigations.
Courts can empower insurance companies
by requiring policyholders to comply with the
policy's terms and conditions and cooperate in
claim investigation. This cooperation would
enable insurance companies to fulfill their
statutory duty of conducting reasonable investigations. Although claim investigations are
initiated because of a suspicion of fraud, not all
investigations result in declination (the refusal
to pay the claim). Often, where the insured
willingly cooperates in the insurer's investigation, those initial questions which gave rise to
the request for formal claim handling are
resolved in favor of the policyholder.
In the absence of policyholder cooperation,
and without meaningful enforcement of policy
cooperation provisions, the insurance company
has two choices when faced with a
policyholder's claim that raises a suspicion of
fraud. First, it can deny the questionable claim
and face the expense of litigation if a policyholder decides to sue. Second, it can pay the
questionable claim, even though the claim
appears to be fraudulent. Both of these options
result in substantially increased costs to the
356 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

insurance company - costs which are passed
to the policyholder in the form of increased
premiums.
III.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH:
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH
THE COOPERATION
PROVISIONS OF THE
INSURANCE CONTRACT

Some jurisdictions continue to require
policyholders' strict compliance with all
conditions in insurance contracts. North
Carolina's Fineberg v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co.6 illustrates this approach. In this
case, after a fire at his home, Mr. Fineberg's
insurance company sent him several letters
demanding an EUO. Fineberg failed to appear
for an EUO,citing poor health. He had suffered five heart attacks, and he feared that the
stress of an EUO might trigger a sixth one.
Fineberg did provide a statement to his insurance company and later submitted a proof of
loss. Furthermore, he was willing to answer
questions if submitted to him in writing.7 The
insurance company refused to accommodate
him and denied his claim. Fineberg filed suit.
The insurer moved for summary judgment
on the basis of Fineberg's failure to submit to
an EUO.Fineberg responded by producing an
affidavit which attested to his troubled medical
history. His cardiologist submitted an affidavit
verifying the policyholder's health problems
and noting the link between stress and heart
attacks.
The Fineberg court held that compliance
with the EUO requirement was a condition
precedent to bringing suit against the insurer.'
"A 'condition precedent' is defined as an event
which must occur, or an act which must be
performed by one party to an existing contract
before the other party is obligated to perform."9 A condition precedent must be performed before the contractual obligation
becomes binding on the parties. Where the
condition precedent is not satisfied, the obligations of the parties end. The court stated,
Volume 9, number 4
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"[W]e are not persuaded by plaintiff's arguments that the [statement given to the insurance company] constituted an examination
under oath for purposes of compliance." 10 As
in any contract, a party failing to comply with
a condition precedent in the contract cannot
recover in a suit on that contract. Under this
strict-compliance approach, a policyholder
must comply with the policy requirements or
the insurance company has no obligation to
pay the claim. There is no in-between level of
policyholder cooperation where the policyholder can "substantially comply" with policy
requirements and still obtain coverage.
Florida also continues to require strict
compliance as demonstrated in Goldman v.
State FarmFire General Ins. Co." In this
case, Richard and Patricia Goldman obtained a
homeowners/tenants policy from State Farm
Fire General Insurance Company in June of
1992. Four months later, the Goldmans reported a burglary and submitted a proof of
loss. State Farm requested the Goldmans'
EUOs. The Goldmans' attorney asked that the
examinations be rescheduled from their original date. The Goldmans then filed suit against
the insurance company, alleging breach of
contract and claiming to have complied with
all conditions precedent to recovery on the
policy. When he filed the complaint, the
Goldmans' attorney suggested that the EUOs
be renoticed as depositions. State Farm refused, and again requested EUOs.
State Farm moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the policyholders' filing suit
without submitting to examinations was a
material breach of the policy and a failure to
satisfy a condition precedent to filing suit on
the policy. In response, the Goldmans argued
that they never actually refused to submit to
their examinations under oath, they only
wanted them rescheduled. In addition, the
Goldmans filed affidavits stating that they had
complied with State Farm's requests "to the
best of their ability." 2
The trial court granted summary judgment,
and the appellate court affirmed, finding that
1997

State Farm was not required to show that it
was prejudiced by the policyholders' noncompliance in order to obtain summary judgment.' 3 The Goldman court analyzed numerous cases from Florida and other jurisdictions
before concluding that the policy provisions
requiring the policyholders to submit to EUOs
were conditions precedent to coverage, and
that prejudice was unnecessary where a violation of a condition precedent was at issue. 14
Like North Carolina and Florida, Illinois has
required strict compliance of the terms of an
insurance contract. Strict compliance was the
rule in Illinois in 1897 when the Illinois Supreme Court held that production of a
policyholder's books and records, when requested, is a reasonable condition precedent to
recovery in a first party claim.'5 This rule held
firm in Illinois for almost ninety years.
Perhaps the last Illinois case to require strict
compliance was Horton v. Allstate Insurance
Co. 6 In that case, Horton's home was damaged by a fire which both parties agreed may
have been intentionally set.17 Horton submitted
a proof of loss, and Allstate rejected it. Allstate
asked Horton to file an amended proof and
submit related documentation. These documents included "books of account, bills, [and]
invoices [as well as] tax returns, utility bills,
and pleadings pertaining to his bankruptcy
petition."' 8 Rather than comply, Horton filed
suit. The trial court granted summary judgment
to Allstate based on Horton's noncompliance.
On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's
holding and stated:
[P]laintiff was under a contractual
obligation to produce those documents expressly specified in the
policy ...Because the [P]laintiff did
not fulfill this condition precedent or
attempt to excuse his noncompliance,
we find that his suit against Allstate
was barred under the policy for
failure to comply with a condition
precedent to which the parties had
both agreed. 9
Loyola University Chicago School of Law e 357

Even though the court refused to allow
Horton to recover, the court's language opened
the door to recovery to those policyholders
who admitted that they had not fully complied
with the conditions of the insurance policy.
The Illinois court suggested that if policyholders could make an excuse for their noncompliance, they might be allowed to recover. With
this, the court started to erode the traditional
doctrine of strict compliance in Illinois.
IV.

A BROAD VIEW OF
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE IN
ILLINOIS: Pirov. Pekin Insurance

Only three years after Horton, in Piro v.
Pekin Insurance Co.,a0 the substantial compliance doctrine made its Illinois debut. In this
case, Charles Piro owned Piro T.V., Heating &
Air Conditioning, Inc. A fire destroyed the
corporate premises, and he filed a claim with
his insurance company. After submitting his
proof of loss, Piro submitted to an EUO five
months after the fire. However, Piro failed to
produce financial records and information
relevant to his financial motive to stage a fire
or inflate his losses resulting from an accidental fire. The insurance company rejected the
claim, insisting on "strict compliance with all
policy provisions."'" Instead of complying
with the insurance company's request for
information, Piro filed suit. The insurer moved
for summary judgment. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the insurance company.
The appellate court reversed, stating:
The question whether [P]laintiffs'
disclosures after defendant's motion
for summary judgment came too late
to comply with the disclosure provisions of the policy is not an appropriate question to decide on motion for
summary judgment. Whether a party
has committed a breach of contract is
generally a question of fact.
*

*

We express no opinion as to
whether the instant [D]efendant can
demonstrate on remand that it would
be inequitable to permit plaintiffs to
comply with the policy at such a late
date. If [D]efendant can demonstrate
the existence of a question of fact as
to whether it was prejudiced, the
issue becomes one of substantial
compliance and is for the jury. 2
Thus, the Fifth District of the Illinois Appellate Court created a requirement that the
insurance company show prejudice resulting
from the policyholder's failure to comply with
the policy provisions. By imposing a prejudice
requirement on the policy, a court essentially
excuses a policyholder's non-cooperation.
Consider the prejudice to the insurer in this
circumstance. The insurer is prejudiced by
having to pay a fraudulent claim - but it can
not know whether a particular suspicious claim
is really an attempted fraud unless it is allowed
to complete its investigation - with the
insured's cooperation. The insurer becomes
trapped in a vicious circle, left to hope that it
can develop a basis upon which to prove fraud
during the discovery phase of litigation on the
policy - long after any possible investigative
trail suggested by the facts of the loss has
grown cold.
This rule enables a policyholder to sue an
insurance company for failure to pay a claim
even if the policyholder himself has not complied with any of the cooperation provisions of
the policy. By forcing insurance companies
either to pay claims they strongly suspect to be
fraudulent or risk lawsuits on every claim they
deny, the Illinois courts have increased the
incentives for dishonest policyholders to
attempt fraud and increased premium costs for
honest consumers.

*
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A.

The First District of the Illinois Appellate
Court subsequently adopted this prejudicebased test in Pick v. Associated Indemnity
Corp.23 In this case, Harold Pick, reported to
his homeowners' insurance company a theft of
personal property valued at over a quartermillion dollars. Four months later, the insurer
required Pick to produce various financial
documents relating to the purchase of the
property allegedly stolen or other proof of
ownership, prior claim information, and property settlement agreements from the Pick's
previous divorces.
Pick did not comply, and the insurer denied
his claim. The insurer withdrew its decision,
however, when Pick agreed to produce the
requested documents and submit to an EUO.
Over a year after the fire, the parties began an
EUO; however, Pick's attorney terminated the
examination mid-stream, and Pick failed to
produce the documents that he had agreed to
submit.24 The insurance company attempted to
reschedule the EUO several times and persisted in its document request.25 The parties
never resumed the examination because either
the policyholder or his attorney canceled each
scheduled date. 26 The insurer continued in its
unsuccessful demand for financial documents
and eventually declined the claim due to Pick's
policy non-compliance.
In response, Pick filed suit, and the insurance company filed a motion for summary
judgment relying on Horton.27 The Pick court
chose to follow the Fifth District's Piro instead
of its own Horton. The Pick court noted:
In Horton, plaintiff failed to resubmit
a proof of loss and failed to produce
any documents requested. Here,
plaintiff has arguably made some
attempt to comply with the policy.
Although plaintiff may not have
been as cooperative as the insured in
1997

Piro,he did produce certain documents and eventually appeared for an
examination under oath, although it
was not completed. These facts show
[P]laintiff made some attempt to
comply with the policy provisions
which is [sic] similar to the situation
presented in Piro.Whether
[P]laintiff's actions amounted to
substantial compliance with the
policy is a question of fact and
therefore, summary judgment in
[D]efendant's favor was improper.28

FirstDistrictFollows the Fifth
Districtin Adopting Substantial
Compliance

With this decision, a second Illinois court
adopted an extremely broad view of substantial
compliance. Although the Illinois Supreme
Court had not spoken on the issue (and still has
not), with the adoption of the substantial
compliance doctrine, the Fifth and First District Illinois Appellate Courts fundamentally
changed the way insurance contracts are read
in Illinois to the detriment of honest Illinois
consumers.
B.

The FirstDistrictAgain Uses
SubstantialCompliance to Eviscerate
the Provisionsof an Insurance
Contract

The First District of the Illinois Appellate
Court reaffirmed the view that any tenuous
stab at compliance was sufficient to raise a
question of "substantial compliance" in Patel
v. Allstate Insurance Co. 29 In that case, an
apartment building insured by Allstate suffered
a fire, and the policyholder, Babu Patel, submitted a proof of loss claiming $118,942.00.
Patel appeared for an EUO but did not produce
any of the financial documents Allstate requested.3" The insurance company likely
requested the documents to determine if Patel
had a motive to burn the building. Patel stated
that these documents were either in the possession of a bankruptcy trustee or that all debts
relating to the building had been paid by the
mortgage company since it had assumed
Loyola University Chicago School of Law * 359
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management of the building.'
But Patel stated that he could not have been
involved in the fire because, at the time of the
fire, he was out of the country.3 2 There are
many ways to corroborate such an alibi: a
stamped passport, for example, or a used
airline ticket. Even Patel's disclosure of his
flight number might have given Allstate
enough information to investigate the truth of
Patel's assertion. Although Patel's attorney
promised full cooperation, neither Patel nor his
attorney ever provided the requested information to corroborate Patel's alibi or financial
position. Subsequently, Allstate rejected Patel's
claim due, in part, to Patel's failure to cooperate with its investigation. Patel, like Pick and
Piro before him, filed suit. The district court
granted summary judgment to Allstate, holding
that plaintiff's failure to produce the requested
documents precluded recovery under the
insurance policy. The appellate court reversed,
again distinguishing the facts of this case from
Horton.33 In noting that Patel had stated that
certain documents were either inaccessible or
in control of third parties, the court held that:
In the present case, unlike Horton,
[P]laintiff made some attempt to
comply with the provisions of the
policy. As in Pick and Piro, Patel
appeared for an examination under
oath and provided some of the
requested information. In addition,
Patel provided explanations for his
failure to fully comply with
defendant's requests. Thus, the
actions of the [P]laintiffs in the
present case can be distinguished
from those of Horton, where the
insured filed suit without responding
to, or attempting to excuse his failure
to respond to, Allstate's request for
records and documentation.
We believe the facts in this case
are sufficient to raise the issue of
whether [P]laintiffs substantially
complied with the terms of the policy
360 o Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

and, therefore,34summary judgment
was improper.
Although Patel and his attorney made
repeated promises of cooperation, they disclosed nothing. 35 Nonetheless, the appellate
court still reversed the granting of summary
judgment in favor of the insurance company. A
close reading of Patelsuggests an Illinois court
may be willing to find "substantial compliance" if an insured makes any effort to create
the mere appearance of cooperation. The
policyholder intent on committing insurance
fraud is thus well advised to repeatedly promise cooperation; empty promises alone may be
sufficient to create a triable issue of fact
regarding whether the insured has sufficiently
cooperated.
Illinois Eviscerates Virtually All
Obligations of Policyholders:
Crowell v. State Farm
Crowell v. State Farm Fireand Casualty
Co.,36 the most recent Illinois case considering

the substantial compliance doctrine, reinforces
this impression. The facts of Crowell should be
particularly troublesome to consumers worried
about the costs of insurance fraud.
Crowell was the subject of a criminal arson
investigation because of the loss for which he
made a claim. Crowell showed up for an EUO
but failed to answer relevant and material
questions concerning his financial status and
walked out of the examination before it was
concluded.37 He refused to produce Paula
Hunter, who had been living with Crowell at
the time of the fire, for examination despite the
carrier's demands.3"
State Farm denied coverage; Crowell sued.
As in the other cases, the insurer moved for
summary judgment. Crowell responded to the
motion by noting that he was not represented
by counsel at his examination, and that many
questions seemed irrelevant and immaterial to
him. Now that the criminal arson charges
against Crowell had been dropped, he was
Volume 9, number 4
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willing to give a deposition and "answer all
material questions
with the guidance of his
39
attorney.
As in the other cases, the trial court granted
summary judgment; the Appellate Court
reversed, holding:
[P]laintiff's conduct does not
demonstrate the type of consistent,
obstinate, and permanent refusal to
cooperate present in those cases in
which summary judgment was
allowed based on breach of the
cooperation clause of the policy.
Plaintiff should have been given the
opportunity by the trial court to cure
his noncompliance upon his offer to
do so prior to the entry of summary
judgment.4 °
The Crowell court stated that the insurance
company must demonstrate some prejudice
before the question of plaintiff's "late compliance ... becomes one of substantial compliance.., for the jury."'" This holding prompted
a vigorous dissent from Presiding Justice
William A. Lewis:
[T]his was not a case of the plaintiff failing to understand the terms of
the policy. He simply refused to
comply with his agreement. The
majority has now written a new
clause into the insurance policy that
says that the insured can refuse to
submit to an oral examination, refuse
to produce members of his household, and refuse to submit requested
documents until ordered by the court.
This ruling abrogates the duties of
the insured under the policy for no
discernible reason. There are not
even public policy reasons suggested
for doing so.42
Thus, according to Crowell, a policyholder
can refuse to cooperate with the insurance
1997

company's investigation, wait for a claim to be
denied, and sue the insurance company for its
alleged noncompliance with the insurance
contract. The insurance company must then
prove how the information it has not received
affected its rights. This requires an insurer to
prove a negative. Such an approach can only
encourage insurance fraud. It gives license to
dishonest policyholders to stonewall investigations and greatly increases the chances that a
"fraud attempted" will be successful.
V.

NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY, AND
IOWA: A RATIONAL
COMPROMISE

Between Illinois' overly broad version of
substantial compliance and the rigid North
Carolina and Florida strict compliance approach, there is a middle ground. New York,
New Jersey, and Iowa have adopted an approach which sometimes allows a policyholder
the opportunity to cure his or her noncompliance but also allows courts to evaluate the
degree of willfulness of an insured's noncompliance on summary judgment.43
In these states, as in all American jurisdictions, the courts do not resolve fact questions
on summary judgment. Rather, courts address
the substance of a policyholder's compliance
as a contract construction issue, which is a
traditional question of law. To illustrate why
this approach does not grant the power to
resolve fact questions to courts reviewing
summary judgment motions, consider the
following cases in which this approach has
been adopted. For example, in Davis v. Allstate
Insurance Co., the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court granted the insurer's
summary judgment motion based on the
policyholder's noncooperation.' The policyholder alleged that he was the victim of two
fires at the insured property on different dates.
He submitted his proof of loss to Allstate five
months after the fires. A consultant hired by
the insurance company determined that one or
both of the fires had been intentionally set.45
Loyola University ChicagoSchool of Law 9 361

Allstate then requested that the policyholder
reasons. First, DiFrancisco did not report the
submit to an EUO.
first burglary for over a month. The court noted
Although the policyholder appeared with
that between the first burglary and
counsel on the appointed date, the examination DiFrancisco's report to the insurance company,
did not proceed because the policyholder
DiFrancisco experienced serious financial
insisted on tape recording the proceedings and problems.5" Additionally, he did not report the
Allstate's attorney refused to be taped.4 6 The
second burglary for 10 months after it allegparties volleyed letters back and forth concern- edly occurred - after the insurance company
ing the proposed taping of the examination.
had already closed its file on the first claim.
Additionally, the policyholder did not comply
Moreover, the insured's ex-wife was apprewith Allstate's demand for the production of
hended by police at the policyholder's precertain financial documents because he bemises during the second "burglary." She
"allegedly admitted removing bedroom furnilieved that these documents were beyond' 47the
inquiry.
"permissible
scope of Allstate's
ture from the house[,] claiming it was her[s]."
Davis filed suit, and Allstate moved for
The policyholder did not press charges against
summary judgment. The trial court denied the
his ex-wife, however, out of consideration, he
motion. The appellate court reversed, looking
said, for their children.52
at the totality of the circumstances surrounding
When DiFrancisco advised his carrier of the
Davis's refusal to cooperate and finding that
first burglary loss, he indicated that the total
Davis's "failure to cooperate was willful" and
amount of his claim was $25,000, even though
"a material breach of the policy." Thus, the
the initial police report on this incident put
the
5
New York appellate court required the policyvalue of the items stolen at only $10,020. 1
holder to cooperate significantly with the
Later, the value of his claim skyrocketed to the
insurance company's investigation in order to
$87,253 figure mentioned above. 54 He denied
maintain a suit against his insurance company.
ever telling the police that his claim was only
The court's refusal to eviscerate the
for $10,000; he likewise denied ever telling his
policyholder's obligations under the contract
insurance agent that this claim was only for
protected both the insurance company and
$25,000. 51 Finally, the insurance company also
48
consumers from fraud.
doubted the validity of DiFrancisco's claim
One might not ordinarily consider a determi- because he suffered heavy business losses
nation of "willfulness" to be a matter of law.
during this period.56
However, a New Jersey case, DiFranciscov.
The insurance company denied the claim
Chubb Insurance Co.,49 clarifies that courts
because the policyholder failed to produce
following this approach are not making inaprequested documents and misrepresented and
propriate factual determinations. The policyconcealed material facts. DiFrancisco sued.
holder, Robert DiFrancisco, controlled corpoThe insurance company moved for summary
rations that owned two restaurants. He made an judgment, citing DiFrancisco's failure to
$87,253 claim to his homeowner's carrier for
produce documents and his misrepresentations.
two burglaries that allegedly took place at his
The trial court granted summary judgment, and
home. The insurance company sought personal the appellate court affirmed on the basis of
financial information from DiFrancisco, and
DiFrancisco's failure to produce the requested
demanded his tax returns and records pertaincorporate records. The appellate court cited a
ing to the two restaurants. DiFrancisco refused line of New York cases which "have recogto produce corporate
records but did submit to
nized that delays in obtaining requested infor50
three EUOs.
mation frequently result in 'a material dilution
The insurance company questioned the
of the insurer's rights."' 57 In addition, the court
validity of the policyholder's claim for several
concluded that the demand for corporate
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records was "highly relevant to the insurer's
him. 62 Citing a 1919 case,63 the Erickson
inquiry concerning plaintiff's financial ability
court defined "substantial" in this context as
to have acquired the items and his potential
meaning "in substance; in the main; essential,
motive for committing fraud by arranging the
including material or essential parts."' In A. W.
58
loss or exaggerating its magnitude." The
Wendell & Sons, Inc. v. Qazi, the Illinois
particular categories of records requested were Appellate Court read Erickson to mean that:
"reasonable and specific in light of these
"[s]ubstantial performance of a contract means
concerns." 59 The policyholder's failure to
performance of all necessary to accomplish the
produce the requested documentation could
purpose of the contract. '65 In Wilmette Partonly be seen as "constituting a willful refusal
ners v. Hamel, the Illinois Appellate Court
to comply with the terms of his insurance
found that the "doctrine of substantial perforcontract." This failure "materially diluted" the
mance is relevant only where the contractor is
insurer's rights. 6°
in technical breach of contract." 66
"Thus, no legal or
A home builder
equitable basis exists
might expend
in these circumthousands of
stances for giving the
The New York and New
dollars and huninsured 'another
dreds of laborchance' to produce
Jersey cases vadiidate the policy
hours without
the records withcreating a habitable
held."' 61
cooperation cla uses without
structure. That,
The New York and
however, would not
New Jersey cases
insisting on "stltic et compliance."
constitute "substanvalidate the policy
tial performance"
cooperation clauses
They recognize t|
hat there must
because "[an]
without insisting on
important factor in
"strict compliance."
be an element 0fsubstance in
determining
They recognize that
whether a builder
there must be an
order for the )licyholder to
has rendered
element of substance
substantial perforin order for the
reasonably ass ei t "substantial
mance is the actual
policyholder to
receipt of benefits
reasonably assert
compi
nce."
ia
by the purchaser/
"substantial compliowner."67 The
ance."
Erickson court
This is not a
stated, "'[tihe
wholly subjective determination, nor one
question of whether there has been substantial
foreign to contract law. For example, the term
performance of the terms and conditions of a
"substantial compliance" is frequently used in
contract sufficient to justify a judgment in
the context of construction contracts. As the
favor of the builder for the contract price is
Illinois Supreme Court stated in WE. Erickson always a question of fact."' 68 A contractor can
Construction,Inc. v. Congress-Kenilworth
not just scratch a vacant lot with a bulldozer,
Corp,"a purchaser who receives substantial
walk off the job and then sue on the construcperformance of a building contract must pay
tion contract and claim that there is a question
the price bargained for, less an offset for
of fact regarding whether the contractor has
"substantially complied" with a contract to
defects in what he received as compared to
what strict performance would have given
build a house. 69
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Because a building contractor's performance for the bank to provide those that are missing,
it might be possible to argue that the insured
under a construction contract is ordinarily a
has not strictly complied with the insurer's
question of fact, it can be only imperfectly
request for information. On the other hand,
analogized to a policyholder's cooperation
could anyone doubt that such a "failure"
obligations following a loss. However, as the
should be deemed merely technical or that the
building cases make clear, an important factor
policyholder's compliance with this request
in the latter situation would be whether the
was substantial? Enforcement of the policy
insurer has actually received the "benefits" of
condition precedent under these circumstances
the policyholder's partial compliance, specifically, information with which it can complete a would impose a forfeiture on merely technical
grounds, and no jurisdiction, even the so-called
good-faith investigation into the merits of the
strict compliance jurisdictions likely would
policyholder's claim. Delay alone operates to
conclude that such a claim would be denied for
it
is
to
which
the
benefits
deny the insurer
failure of a condition precedent in that case.
entitled under the cooperation provisions.
The author's object is to formulate a general
Why substantial compliance might be a
rule regarding how courts should treat quesquestion of fact in a building case, but not in
tions of an insured's substantial compliance
an insurance case, is explained by realizing
and still honor policy conditions precedent.
that, in the building contract situation, the
entire contract is being evaluated; in the insur- Brown v. Danish Mutual InsuranceAss'n,7 1
provides a workable blueprint for such a rule.
ance context, it is the policyholder's own
compliance with conditions precedent that is at Duane Brown reported a theft of $13,820 in
antique articles from the basement of his
issue.70 In other words, the courts in a first
farmhouse.72 Within a month of this loss,
party insurance case are being asked to deterBrown provided his insurance company a
mine whether there has been a failure of a
proof of loss and inventory forms. In the
condition precedent to recovery under the
policy; if the condition has not been met, there meantime, however, the local sheriff's office
had informed the insurance company that the
can be no question of the insurer's breach. In
theft seemed suspicious.73
this context, a court's willingness to allow
"substantial" as opposed to "strict" compliance
Danish elected to require Brown to submit
to an EUO. Brown refused and told Danish
with the condition may be seen as consistent
that he had no intention of submitting at any
with the law's traditional reluctance to enforce
time in the near future.74 Danish sent a second
contract provisions that result in forfeitures.
notice, advising him specifically that such
It is fairly easy to see that in Piro, Pekin,
refusal was a breach of the insurance contract
Patel, Crowell, Davis, and DiFrancisco,the
and would cause Danish to deny the claim.
insureds could not reasonably be said to have
substantially complied with their policy obliga- Brown again declined to appear.7 5 Danish
denied his claim. In response, Brown sued,
tions notwithstanding the varying results in
alleging breach of the insurance contract and
these cases. It is likewise easy to construct
situations where a court could rule, as a matter bad faith. Danish moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion.
of law, that the insured had indeed substanOn appeal, Brown argued that the trial court
If
obligations.
policy
with
his
complied
tially
erred in determining that his refusal to submit
the policyholder is requested to produce 12
to an EUO "amounted to a failure to substanmonths worth of checking account statements
tially comply with the terms of the insurance
acquire
to
to show financial wherewithal
policy. 7 6 Citing Watson v. NationalSurety
in
a
stolen
allegedly
goods
recently purchased
Corp.,77 the Brown court noted that the Iowa
home burglary, but can only find 10 or 11
Court had found that submission to
Supreme
statements and readily signs an authorization
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an EUO is a condition precedent to a
policyholder's recovery on a policy, but that
strict compliance with this provision is not
required. It is, however, the policyholder who
bears the burden of proving that he or she has
substantially complied with the policy requirement."8 The insurer might have to justify the
reasonableness of requirements (as the insurer
persuaded the courts in DiFranciscothat the
requests for business records were germane to
the homeowner's claims), but it is the insured
who must carry the burden of showing that his
or her compliance with these requests was
reasonable in the circumstances. 79 This construction is reasonable because any party to a
contract containing conditions precedent must
demonstrate that these conditions were fulfilled in order to enforce the contract. Moreover, this approach benefits individual policyholders because they are not unduly burdened
by overly technical requirements, and consumers benefit because fraud-fighting policy
provisions can be meaningfully enforced.
The Brown court recognizes that policy
cooperation obligations are conditions precedent to recovery. These cooperation provisions
help insurers prevent fraud and help policyholders know that they fail to comply with
these provisions at their own risk. Yet the
Brown court would not strictly enforce these
provisions; it would not permit a claim to be
forfeited because the insured made some
technical or unimportant misstep in presenting
a claim. Upholding policy cooperation provisions helps everyone involved. The policyholder must explain why he or she could not
fully comply, and the insurer is not obliged to
demonstrate that it was prejudiced because it
could not act on information it does not have
and which the insured refused to provide.
VI.

RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES

In the author's view, it is unlikely that any
jurisdiction that has abandoned strict compliance can be persuaded to return that standard.
Harsh as it may seem in some applications,
1997

"strict compliance" has the virtue of predictability and provides the strongest disincentive
to commit fraud. Moreover, in those instances
where a policyholder really believed that the
carrier's request for particular documents was
overbroad or unduly intrusive, the policyholder
could always seek a declaration of his or her
rights under the insurance contract.
For those states that have shifted to a "substantial compliance" approach, however, the
Iowa, New Jersey, and New York cases discussed herein suggest a reasonable way to
apply the doctrine. What constitutes "substantial compliance" must be a question of law for
the court to decide on a summary judgment
motion, rather than a question of fact, because
the issue of whether the condition precedent to
recovery has been sufficiently fulfilled, is in
essence, an issue of contract construction
appropriate for judicial determination. There
may be a factual dispute concerning what the
policyholder produced in response to the
insurer's requests, but if the facts of the
policyholder's partial compliance are established, the court should be able to determine
whether the policyholder's partial compliance
sufficiently fulfills the condition precedent and
rises to the level of "substantial compliance."
VII.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the insurer has bargained in the
contract for tools to protect itself against false
claims; these tools are essential to effectuate
the purpose of the insurance policy - indemnification - unless, of course, one wants to
seriously argue that an insurer should not care
whether a given claim is valid or fraudulent.
Surely an insurer owes an obligation to
promptly pay all valid claims; just as surely,
however, an insurer owes its stockholders and
the consumers who pay its premiums, a duty
not to pay fraudulent claims. Where a policyholder denies the insurer the effective or
meaningful use of the tools designed to ferret
out fraud, the policyholder has not "substantially complied" with its policy obligations.
Loyola University Chicago School of Law * 365
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